The development and use of advanced and innovative neuroscience, neurotechnology and some forms of artificial intelligence have exposed potential threats to the human condition, including human rights. As a result, reconceptualizing or creating human rights (i.e. neurorights) has been proposed to address specific brain and mind issues like free will, personal identity and cognitive liberty. However, perceptions, interpretations and meanings of these issues—and of neurorights—may vary between countries, contexts and cultures, all relevant for an international-consensus definition and implementation of neurorights. (...) Thus, we encourage reflecting on the proactive inclusion of transnational, cross-cultural and contextual considerations and concerns to contribute to the global discourse. This inclusion does not mean endorsing ethical relativism but rather a call to foster a universal understanding of key concepts and concerns. Including contextual and cultural perspectives may truly anticipate global concerns which could be addressed while developing and implementing neurorights. Consequently, any ethical and/or legal regulatory framework(s) for the translational and transnational use of advanced neuroscience, neurotechnology and some forms of artificial intelligence intended to protect and safeguard human dignity should be contextually and culturally mindful, responsible, respectful and inclusive of not only human rights and fundamental freedoms but also of neurocognitive cultural diversity. (shrink)

In this article, we propose a philosophical exploration on the main problems involved in two neurorights that concern autonomous action, namely free will and cognitive liberty, and sketch a possible solution to these problems by resourcing to a holistic interpretation of human actions. First, we expose the main conceptual and practical issues arising from the neuroright to “free will,” which are far from minor: the term itself is denied by some trends participating in the neurorights debate, the related concept of (...) ultimate control is also disputed, the understanding of free will depends on cultural context, and the exercise of being free to act in several domains may be covered by other regulations. Second, we analyze the historical origin of cognitive liberty, its current status, and its relation with free will. Third, we criticize the concept of decision in mainstream action theory and propose to conceive action as a unified process constituted by three explanatory, non-sequential dimensions: intention, decision, and action realization. Fourth, we discuss two possible cases involving neurotechnologies and suggest ways to interpret them according to a unified framework in which free will and cognitive liberty fall under a single neuroright to personal autonomy. Finally, we outline a recommendation to introduce freedom of thought and personal autonomy as complementary neurorights to protect both the internal and external dimensions of thought and action. (shrink)

Despite its obvious advantages, the disruptive development of neurotechnology can pose risks to fundamental freedoms. In the context of such concerns, proposals have emerged in recent years either to design human rights de novo or to update the existing ones. These new rights in the age of neurotechnology are now widely referred to as “neurorights.” In parallel, there is a considerable amount of ongoing academic work related to updating the right to freedom of thought in order to include the protection (...) of “freedom of thinking” (i.e., freedom of thought itself) and not only its social manifestations. Neurorights such as cognitive liberty, free will, mental freedom, and mental self-determination come into play here. Importantly, freedom of thought has often been considered a prerequisite for all the other fundamental freedoms and rights. In any case, just as other rights require additional legal instruments to guarantee their compliance, substantial neurorights will probably require specific complementary developments in procedural law. In relation to this, there is a long tradition of habeas corpus as an emergency remedy to enforce the rights of a citizen against illegal or arbitrary detention. More recently, the habeas data writ has been proposed and admitted in certain countries to guarantee a person’s ownership of their personal data. In this article, we propose to expand this procedural apparatus by incorporating a third habeas, which we call habeas cogitationem: a writ aimed primarily at enforcing the right to freedom of thinking (and, subsidiarily, the rest of neurorights) against direct, harmful interferences in a person’s thought process by both public and private perpetrators. (shrink)

In their valuable call-for-action article, Wexler and Specker Sullivan (2023) propose an integration–inclusion–impact axis for “translational neuroethics,” to face the challenges and criticisms tha...

En este trabajo, inspirados por la mentalidad agustiniana, trataremos el libre albedrío como medio necesario para lograr la felicidad. Tras unas reflexiones generales sobre la mente, el libre albedrío y la felicidad, hablaremos acerca del libre albedrío como requisito para la felicidad y nos centraremos en el libertarismo. Los partidarios de esta corriente sostienen que el libre albedrío existe pero es incompatible con el determinismo, de modo que requiere alguna clase de indeterminismo. Esto trae consigo un problema de inteligibilidad: ¿acaso (...) el indeterminismo no conlleva aleatoriedad y, como consecuencia, carencia de control sobre lo que decidimos y hacemos? Sin embargo, describiremos dos propuestas libertaristas que tratan de dar una explicación inteligible al papel que desempeña el indeterminismo en el ejercicio de nuestro libre albedrío. La primera propuesta, que es ampliamente conocida internacionalmente, es la de Robert Kane. La segunda ha sido defendida por Carlos Moya, el más importante pensador libertarista dentro del ámbito hispano. (shrink)

The question addressed in this paper is whether particular emotional experiences or episodes of an emotion (such as two experiences of happiness) belong to a natural kind. The final answer to this question is that although some, even many, single episodes of an emotion may group into a natural kind, belonging to a natural kind is a highly contextual matter. The proposal relies on two premises. First, a conception of natural kind-hood that follows Boyd’s Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory. Second, a (...) view of emotional episodes that fits with the External Theory of Perception: typical emotional episodes are perceptual experiences of emotional affordances. After pointing out what candidates for emotional homeostatic properties could be like and suggesting some examples of emotional homeostatic mechanisms, the authors conclude that there are property clusters of emotional perceptions stabilized by homeostatic mechanisms. In spite of this, what counts as an emotional natural kind depends on many factors, not all of them natural: world properties, bodily and mental states of the agent, learning mechanisms that help us to satisfactorily navigate in the world, cultural differences that determine our perceptual style, as well as different interests which guide the explanation and prediction of emotional episodes. (shrink)

There is a peak in peer victimization during middle childhood, with multiple negative consequences. Parental use of corporal punishment and child aggression are the most widely studied predictors of this phenomenon. The aim of the present study was to analyze whether parental use of corporal punishment affects peer victimization through child aggression. This mediation model was explored for both mothers and fathers and for both physical and relational forms of aggression and peer victimization. Furthermore, we also analyzed whether the mediation (...) models were moderated by the sex of the child. Participants were 234 third graders. Child aggression and victimization were measured by peers using the Mini Direct Indirect Aggression Inventory. Independent measures of mother’s and father’s use of corporal punishment were obtained from a PCA of items from the Parental Styles and Dimensions Questionnaire. Conditional process modeling was carried out using a macro for SPSS developed by Hayes. Results indicated that aggression mediated the relation of parental corporal punishment to peer victimization. Some interesting moderating effects of sex in this mediation model were found; specifically, physical, and relational aggression mediated the relation of maternal corporal punishment to peer victimization only in boys. Few studies to date have addressed the connection between aggressive behavior and peer victimization as outcomes of corporal punishment, taking into consideration the role of parent’s and child’s sex, and both physical and relational forms of aggression and victimization during childhood. (shrink)

Volume 33, Issue 7, October 2020, Page 1045-1048.

Hoy más que nunca, inmersa Europa en una preocupante crisis que cuestiona su propio devenir, conviene reflexionar sobre lo que mantiene unido a los Estamos miembros de la Unión Europea como proyecto político. Sostenemos que, en ausencia de una lengua, religión u otras señales identitarias, Europa es ante todo una Comunidad de Derecho. Reivindicamos en este trabajo, a través de un discurso diacrónico, el papel de primera línea que han jugado el Derecho y las tradiciones jurídicas europeas como amalgama de (...) una esencia propia, que llega hasta nuestros días a través de la mayor aportación europea a la Cultura mundial: la democracia y los Derechos humanos tal y como actualmente se conciben. (shrink)

In this paper we critically analyze the situation of quantum mechanics in discussions on free will. It starts describing how the uncertainty principle and the measurement problem pose a challenge to determinism. Next, we present positions supporting and rejecting correlation between quantum phenomena and free will. Finally, we will place all these issues into the context of five key questions set out by Robert Kane: the Compatibility, Significance, Intelligibility, Existence and Determinist Questions.

In this paper I propose a hypothetical model of mental causation that I call semantic pruning and which could be defined as the causal influence of contents and meanings on the spatial configuration of the network of synapses of an individual. I will be guided by two central principles: 1) the causal influence of the mental occurs by virtue of external semantic constraints and consists in the selective activation of certain physical powers, 2) when the selective activation is continual, it (...) triggers a process of synaptic pruning in the neural and neuromuscular network. (shrink)